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NRD TRUSTEES: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE 
THEY TRULY TRUSTEES? 
LAURA ROWLEY* 
Abstract: Several federal environmental statutes have empowered the 
federal government to appoint executive branch agencies to act as 
trustees on behalf of the public to oversee the process of collecting 
damages from responsible parties, and restoring natural resources that 
have been damaged on public lands. This Note will focus on the 
question of whether these natural resource damages (NRD) trustees 
created by federal statute have a common law fiduciary duty to the 
public, some lesser obligation, or no fiduciary duty at all. This Note 
concludes that courts have not held executive branch NRD trustees to a 
common law fiduciary duty, but instead have granted them typical 
agency deference. Finally, this Note suggests that courts should hold 
NRD trustees to an enforceable fiduciary duty, similar to the one 
applied to government trustees under the Indian trust doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the environmental movement of the 1970s, states had lim-
ited common law authority to recover damages for injury to public 
natural resources, and the federal government had to rely on explicit 
legislative mandates before taking action. l In a provision of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),2 Congress established the first scheme whereby federal 
and state governments could appoint trustees who would have the 
power to bring suit to collect damages from parties whose toxic waste 
injured natural resources on public land.3 The idea of recovering for 
natural resource damages (NRDs) is conceptually similar to the tort 
law doctrine of providing a sum of money to "make the victim whole 
again," although here the victim is the environment rather than a pri-
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-01. 
1 See Fredrick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 405, 406 (1989). 
242 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
~ See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f); Anderson, supra note 1, at 406. 
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vate party.4 Like tort, the concept involves the shifting of loss; since 
natural resource restoration is extremely expensive, the trustees must 
pursue damages so that taxpayers are not burdened with these ex-
penses.5 Despite its similarity to prior existing doctrines of common 
law, the idea of recovering damages on behalf of the environment is 
also revolutionary because it incorporates the natural resources' in-
trinsic worth.6 The marketplace economy, which assigns value to natu-
ral resources based on the economic worth they hold for humans, 
does not typically recognize their intrinsic worth.7 CERCLA's re-
quirement that NRD trustees use recovered funds to replace or re-
store the damaged natural resource to its "baseline condition as 
measured ... [by] ·the injured resource's physical, chemical, or bio-
logical properties or the services previously provided"8 demonstrates 
the statute recognizes that acceptable cleanup and recovery standards 
for humans may not be standards high enough for an ecosystem.9 It 
further recognizes that the value of natural resources should not al-
ways be quantified in human economic terms.10 
Today, two more major federal statutes-the Clean Water Act 
(CWA)l1 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)12-join CERCLA in allow-
ing recovery of natural resource damages,13 and individual states are 
4 See Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Envi-
ronmentalLaw, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 851, 853 (1989). 
5 See Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorpa-
ration of the Public Trust Doctrine Into Natural Resource Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 353, 
357 (1992). The taxpayers would either literally pay the cost of restoration, or would 
figuratively "pay" by the result of no action taken to restore the damaged natural re-
sources. See id. 
6 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw 
AND SOCIETY 60 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw). 
7 See id. at 57-58, 60. 
S Chase, supra note 5, at 356 (quoting Prince William Sound and Gulf of Alaska; Resto-
ration Work Plan and Program, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,160, 48,161 (1990». 
9 See id. The author explains that additional injuries to natural resources can be caused 
by the problem of biomagnification. See id. at 356 n.22. For example, PCBs and DDT are 
chemicals that do not easily deteriorate, and their hazardous effects are magnified by 
transmittal up the food chain. See id. They become concentrated in higher organisms, such 
as birds and marine mammals, at levels as high as a million times greater than normal 
concentration in water or marine sediments. See id. Anthropocentric dean-up standards 
may not be good enough to relieve problems caused by this phenomenon. See id. at 356. 
10 See Chase, supra note 5, at 356. 
11 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(1994). 
12 Oil Pollution, Liability and Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994). 
13 Other statutes such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and the Marine 
Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act amendments of 1988 provide for governmental 
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allowed to create their own NRD statutory schemes,14 The statutes al-
low appointed government entitiesI5 to act as trustees to oversee the 
process of repairing damaged natural resources, which includes initial 
damage assessments, bringing suit against and collecting awards from 
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) , and applying the recovered 
funds to restoration of the damaged natural resources.I6 This scheme 
is complex. An understanding of its full meaning is frustrated by the 
fact that there is little case law in the area, and most cases that have 
been brought ended short of full litigation when parties agreed to a 
settlement.I7 Many questions remain unanswered about the legal 
status of NRD trustees,18 This Note will focus on whether the execu-
tive branch NRD trustees created by federal statute have a common 
law fiduciary duty to the public, some lesser obligation, or none at all. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the CERClA, CWA, and 
OPA NRD provisions; Part II discusses the roots of the NRD provi-
sions; Part III provides an example of the federal government acting 
as trustee in another area of law-the Indian trust doctrine; Part IV 
explores past and current litigation based on statutory NRD provi-
sions; and Part V determines that courts have granted NRD trustees 
agency deference, but suggests that courts should instead hold NRD 
trustees to a fiduciary duty similar to the one applied to government 
trustees under the Indian trust doctrine. 
I. A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION: NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 
A. The Three Economies 
Most lawmakers are aware of and incorporate an understanding 
of the marketplace economy into the laws that they create,19 In the 
realm of environmental law and policy, however, laws based only on 
an understanding of the marketplace economy often will not be 
recovery of natural resource damages in varying degrees. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 
406 n.l; Breen, supra note 4, at 855-56. 
14 See Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: lWwse Side Are They Really 
On?, 5 ENVTL. LAw. 407,413 (Feb. 1999). 
15 Often the trustees are Department of Interior (Interior) under CERCLA, and the 
Commerce Department's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
under OPA. See iii. at 412, 417-18. 
16 See iii. at 407,413. 
17 See Gerald F. George, Litigation of Claims for Natural Resource Damages, SD88 A.L.I.-
A.BA 631, 633 (1999). 
18 See generally Murray et al., supra note 14. 
19 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 58. 
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sufficient to achieve the goals of regulating behavior to maintain a 
healthy ecosystem.20 The marketplace economy has been slow to ac-
knowledge a need for recovery of NRDs because natural resources are 
not easily quantified in terms of monetary value, and thus the mar-
ketplace economy undervalues or ignores them.21 It is necessary, 
therefore, to look beyond familiar market forces and to consider two 
other "economies" in order to explain the need for NRD recovery.22 
The marketplace economy, while undoubtedly a sophisticated 
and intricate mechanism for dealing with the distribution of resources 
in our complex society, is limited because it takes for granted many 
natural resources that cannot be reduced to a monetary value.23 
Scholars have recognized a "natural economy" that exists and oper-
ates alongside the marketplace economy, sometimes overlapping with 
it.24 The natural economy accounts for what happens in the physical 
world and values the biological and "geophysical systems that sustain 
dynamic planetary processes. "25 It overlaps with the marketplace 
economy when it supplies vital resources and services to humans.26 
Much of what comprises the natural economy, however, lies outside 
the marketplace economy, which may account for why legal protec-
tion of natural resources has been slow to develop.27 
A third economy, the "civic-societal economy," incorporates the 
entire market economy but extends beyond traditional notions of 
goods and services that can be exchanged for money.28 While some-
times overlapping with the natural economy,29 it can best be described 
as "encompass[ing]the public, societal values, ethics, benefits and 
losses that cumulatively shape the full and long-term interests of soci-
ety. "30 The health of the marketplace and civic-societal economies are 
often directly and substantially linked to the health of the natural 
20 See Zygmunt J .B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a sprawling 
Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything is Connected to Everything 
Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 359, 366 (1999) [hereinafter Plater, ThreeEconomies]. 
21 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 58; Plater, Three Economies, supra 
note 20, at 367. 
22 See Plater, Three Economies, supra note 20, at 367-69. 
23 See id. at 373. 
24 See id. at 367-74. 
2S PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 58; see also Plater, Three Economies, su-
pranote 20, at 370. 
20 See Plater, Three Economies, supra note 20, at 370. 
27 See id. at 370, 373. 
28 See id. at 368. 
29 See id. at 369. 
30 Id. at 370. 
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economy, with its life-sustaining systems of "soil, water, air and living 
communities ... [w]hen a resource system is derogated or destroyed, 
some enterprises may prosper greatly, but the society is likely to be far 
less well off. "31 Congress implicitly incorporated this idea into its crea-
tion of government trustees to protect and restore natural resources 
that have been damaged.32 
B. CERCLA, OPA, and CWA 
While several federal statutes provide some legal authority to re-
cover NRDs, CERCLA is the primary vehicle because it provides the 
most extensive legal framework for NRD recoveries.33 CERCLA § 107 
addresses liability for violators of the Act's provisions.34 Specifically, 
§ 107(f) covers liability for damage to natural resources, and allows 
the United States government, any state government, and any Indian 
tribe to act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural resources 
to recover for the damages.35 Under § 107(f) (2), the President must 
designate federal officials to act as trustees, and the Governor of each 
state must designate state officials to act as trustees on behalf of the 
public. 36 
The natural resources covered by CERCLA include: 
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking 
water supplies, and other resources belonging to, managed 
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled 
by the United States ... , any State or local government, any 
Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust re-
striction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.37 
This definition excludes "purely private" property, yet makes clear 
that land does not have to be owned by the government to be covered 
~l PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 59. Of course, harm to a resource 
system will cause prosperity to some enterprise, but the idea of protecting natural re-
sources stems from concern for society as a whole. See id. 
~2 See 42 u.s.c. § 9607(f) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994); see 
also PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 57-59. 
~~ See Chase, supra note 5, at 358. 
M See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
~5 See id. § 9607 (f). 
36 See id. The language is mandatory: the President and Governor "shall designate" 
officials to act as trustees, and those officials "shall assess damages" to natural resources. See 
id. (emphasis added). 
~7 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). 
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by the statute.38 Instead, there must be a degree of government regu-
lation, management or control over the land for it to be considered a 
natural resource within the meaning of the statute.39 Cases thus far 
have been brought to protect an aquifer,40 a state's wildlife and sport 
fish,41 a stream and groundwater,42 and all drinking water sources 
within a state.43 
The Oil Pollution Act and Clean Water Act both have a provision 
similar to CERClA's NRD provision.44 The CWA allows federal and 
state officials, as trustees, to sue on behalf of the public to recover 
"any costs or expenses incurred by the Federal Government or any 
state government in the restorati~n or replacement of natural re-
sources damaged or destroyed as a result of oil or a hazardous sub-
stance" having been spilled into navigable waters.45 The CWA NRD 
provision is implemented by the Department of Interior (Interior) in 
the same manner as the CERClA NRD provision, employing the same 
regulations.46 
Enacted by Congress in 1990 in response to the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill, OPA is the most recent federal statute that allows for recovery of 
natural resource damages.47 Like CERClA, the natural resource dam-
ages provision of OPA states that "the President, or the authorized 
representative of any state, Indian tribe, or foreign government, shall 
act on behalf of the public, Indian tribe, or foreign country as trustee 
of natural resources."48 Despite the similarity, OPA's natural resource 
damages provision improves upon CERClA's scheme in some 
38 See Craig R. O'Connor, Natural Resource Damages Under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the Oil PoUution Act, SD67 AU-ABA 145, 
150-51 (Feb. 1999) (citing Ohio v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 880 F.2d 432, 460 (D.C. 
Cir.1989». 
59 See id. 
40 See id. at 151 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 650 (3d 
Cir. 1988». 
41 See id. (citing State of Idaho v. S. Refrigerated Transp., No. 88-1279, slip op. at 11-
12 (D. IdahoJan. 25, 1991». 
42 See id. (citing State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 
1983». 
45 See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 151 (citing Lutz v. Chromatex, 718 F. Supp. 413, 419 
(M.D. Pa. 1989». 
44 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (b) (2) (A) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (4) (1994); 42 U.S.C. 
§9607(f) (1994). 
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f) (4). 
46 E.g., 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1997); see Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 415-16. 
47 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (b) (2) (A); Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 416. 
48 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (1); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1). 
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significant ways.49 First, OPA allows trustees to use funds from the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund to perform initial site assessments and file 
claims against PRPs.50 In contrast, CERCLA prohibits trustees from 
using Superfund money to fund initial assessments of sites for natural 
resource damages.51 This oversight has had the effect of placing trus-
tees in the unfortunate position of being forced to settle with one or 
more PRPs in order to obtain sufficient funds to perform a site as-
sessment.52 The dangers of this predicament are obvious-settling 
forecloses the possibility of filing suit against that PRP once the true 
extent of the damage it caused has been discovered. 53 In fact, this lack 
of funding has often proved to be an insurmountable obstacle be-
cause agency budgets have historically authorized little or no funding 
for natural resource damage actions.54 
The OPA NRD provision also differs from that of CERCLA in that 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), not 
Interior, promulgated its regulations and usually acts as the govern-
ment trustee.55 NOAA filed lawsuits under CERLCA and OPA in Mas-
sachusetts, California, Washington, and Alaska, and its efforts have so 
far appeared to be more successful than those of Interior.56 
Finally, there are other federal statutes that allow more limited 
claims for natural resource damages,57 and, in addition to the federal 
49 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 416-17. 
50 See 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2), (5) (1994); Murray et aI., supra note 14 at 416. 'The Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund is funded by an environmental tax on petroleum under the In-
ternal Revenue Code as well as by provisions under various other statutes, including OPA, 
CWA, the Deepwater Port Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, and 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act." Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 417 n.30; see 
26 U.S.C. § 9509 (b) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1517(f) (1994); 33 U.S.C. -§§ 1319(c), 1321 (1994); 
33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(f), 2715 (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1517(f) (1994); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1653, 1656 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996); 43 U.S.C. § 1812 (1994). 
51 See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(c) (1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (b) (2) (1994); Murray et aI., su-
pra note 14, at 417 n.31. 
52 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp.l019, 1031-32 (D. 
Mass. 1989); Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 428 n.89. 
5~ See generally In re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. 1019. 
54 See Chase, supra note 5, at 372. 
55 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 417. 
56 See Chase, supra note 5, at 355, 365-71. 
57 See Anderson, supra note 1, at 406 n.l (citing Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Amendment of 1978,43 U.S.C. § 1813(a) (2) (C)-(D), (b) (3) (1982); Deepwater Port Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1517(i)(3) (1982); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C 
§ 1653(a)(I), (c) (1) (1982». 
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statutes, each state is free to develop its own statutory scheme for 
NRDS.58 
C. The Trustees' Responsibilities 
To establish the liability of a potentially responsible partY (PRP) 
under CERClA, a trustee must not only establish the same elements 
of a claim as for recovery of response costs,59 but also establish injury 
and causation.60 Establishing injury can be difficult where it is neces-
sary to demonstrate a change in the resource's baseline condition.61 
Often, information on the baseline condition (before the release of 
the hazardous substance took place) is unavailable.62 The causation 
element is also problematic because the necessary standard is unset-
tled. For example, a Massachusetts federal district court held that a 
trustee need only demonstrate that the contaminant is a "contribut-
ing factor" to the injury,63 while a California federal district court held 
that the contaminant must be the "sole or substantially contributing 
factor" to the injury.64 
It is clear, however, that despite any difficulties in the process of 
pursuing natural resource damages, Congress did intend for these 
cases to be brought.65 Moreover, there are fiduciary duties that restrict 
trustees' discretion.66 
D. Trustees Have Conflicting Interests 
With the exception of the federally recognized Indian tribes, 
NRD trustees are governmental entities, subject to the obligations 
58 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (stating that states' interest in 
conservation and protection of wild animals are legitimate local purposes similar to states' 
interest in protecting the health and safety of their citizens). 
59 These elements are: "(1) the release; (2) of a hazardous substance; (3) from a vessel 
or at a facility; (4) by a responsible party as defined in the statute." George, supra note 17, 
at 641. 
60 See id. at 641-42. 
61 See id. at 641. 
62 See id. 
63 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollu-
tion, 722 F. Supp. 893, 897 (D. Mass. 1989). 
64 United States v. Montrose Chern. Corp. of Cal., 788 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (C.D. Cal. 
1991); see also George, supra note 17, at 642. 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994) (stating the President and Governor "shall designate" 
officials to act as trustees, and those officials "shall assess damages" to natural resources) . 
66 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollu-
tion, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1031-32 (D. Mass. 1989). 
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that status confers.67 As a large administrative body, Interior cannot 
escape its involvement in other projects or its knowledge of other pri-
orities that may affect its ability to put the needs of the NRD trust 
beneficiaries ahead of itself.68 While these other interests do not nec-
essarily preclude Interior from fulfilling its fiduciary duty, if it indeed 
has one, these conflicts of interest may to lead to the following prob-
lems: 
(1) using recovered damages inappropriately for restoration 
activities outside of the statutory requirements to restore, 
replace, and acquire equivalent natural resources; (2) abus-
ing settlement authority to benefit PRPs for political reasons; 
(3) precluding private parties from compensation for a loss 
resulting from the damaged natural resource; (4) increasing 
assessment costs and fees to fund the trustee's own office; 
(5) avoiding liability when the trustee is a PRP; and finally 
(6) increasing costs due to overlapping jurisdiction with 
other federal, state, and tribal trustees.69 
In fact, many of these potential problems have actually come to pass, 
demonstrating the need for more clearly defined duties on the part of 
these government agencies when they act as trustees.70 
II. ROOTS OF NRD PROVISIONS: COMMON LAw TRUST AND THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE 
Neither a private entity nor a local government may bring CER-
CLA natural resource damage claims unless it has been appointed 
trustee by a state governor.71 Instead, the individual or local govern-
ment must rely on a state or federal government entity to bring the 
claim.72 The public is in a position of vulnerability, relying on and 
placing its trust in the government to accomplish restoration of the 
damaged natural resources in which each member of the public has a 
stake. In short, CERCLA and the other federal statutes that allow for 
67 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 423. 
68 See ill. at 423-24. 
69 Id. at 424. 
70 See id. at 424-45. 
71 See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 149-50 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle 
County, 851 F.2d 643, 649 (3d Cir. 1988); Lutz v. Chromatex, 718 F. Supp. 413,419 (M.D. 
Pa. 1989»; see also James Peck, Measuringjustice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating 
NaturaIResourceDama~s, 14]. Lum USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 297-98 (1999). 
7ll See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 149-50. 
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NRD trustees have created a trust relationship between the govern-
ment and the public.73 This section will explore first the common law 
of private trusts, then provide a brief summary of the public trust doc-
trine, which some commentators have asserted is the root of the fed-
eral statutory NRD provisions. 
A. Common Law Trust 
Generally, a trust is a device that allows a trustee to manage 
property for one or more beneficiaries.74 The theory of a trust rela-
tionship involves varying degrees of ownership on the part of trustees 
and beneficiaries.75 Neither owns the trust property to the exclusion 
of the other: "the trustee owns the legal interest and the beneficiary 
owns the equitable interest. "76 To create a trust at common law, a 
property owner transfers assets to a trustee, usually by means of a writ-
ten document setting forth the terms of the trust.77 In order to create 
a trust, there must exist a settlor (property owner who created the 
trust), a trustee, and a beneficiary.78 A trustee may also be a 
beneficiary, but a valid trust must have at least one beneficiary who is 
not a trustee, under the theory that such a beneficiary would be will-
ing to go to court to enforce the terms of the trust against any mis-
conduct on the part of the trustee.79 There must also be a corpus 
(trust property),80 and intent on the part of the settlor to create a 
trust. 81 
A trust relationship between a trustee and beneficiary carries 
with it the highest fiduciary duty known at law.82 Trustees must be 
proactive in gathering and preserving assets,83 and making them pro-
ductive.84 The "duty of loyalty" mandates that trustees put the interests 
of beneficiaries above their own-to a standard that is illustrated as 
73 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 JESSE DUXEMINIER & STANLEY M.JOHANSON, WIU.S, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 435 (4th 
ed.1990). 
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 4, 17 (1959). "The phrase 'terms of the 
trust' means the manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust ex-
pressed in a manner which admits of its proof in judicial proceedings. " Id. § 4. 
78 Seeid. § 2(h). 
79 Seeid. § 99(e). 
80 See id. § 74. 
81 See id. § 23. 
82 See id. § 2(b). 
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959). 
84 See id. § 176. 
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being above reasonableness, but somewhat less than self-sacrifice.85 
When investigating whether a trustee has abided by this duty of loy-
alty, a court looks both to the trustee's actions and her state of mind.86 
The duty of loyalty doctrine includes the "no further inquiry 
rule": if a trustee has benefited in any way from a transaction made on 
behalf of the trust beneficiary, a court will conclude that there has 
been a breach of the duty of loyalty, regardless of whether the 
beneficiary has benefited, or will ultimately benefit, from the transac-
tion.87 The only exceptions to this rule against self-dealing on the part 
of a trustee arise when the settlor of a trust has agreed to the particu-
lar action that would constitute self-dealing, or when all the 
beneficiaries of the trust agree to it after being fully informed of the 
action and its potential consequences.88 
Other common law duties of trustees include the duty to earmark 
trust propertyB9 and the duty not to co-mingle trust property with the 
trustee's own property.90 Under the duty to earmark trust property, 
the trustee must keep copious notes and a paper trail of all invest-
ments of the corpus.9} The duty not to co-mingle is self-explanatory: 
the trustee must keep the trust corpus separate from his or her own 
property.92 
Finally, trustees have a duty not to delegate.93 Historically, under 
the common law, a trustee had to handle personally all investments 
and other transactions made with the trust property.94 More recently, 
however, courts have approved delegation of tasks, so long as the 
delegation is done prudently.95 To prove that a task was delegated 
prudently, a trustee must show that he or she researched the selected 
agent; if the trustee makes a negligent delegation, he or she is liable 
for the resulting losses.96 
85 See id. § 170. 
86 SeeDuKEMINIER&jOHANSON, supra note 76, at 851. 
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 170 cmt. h (1959); DUKEMINIER &jOHAN-
SON, supra note 76, at 852. 
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 216 (1959). 
89 See id. § 172. 
90 See id. § 179. 
91 See id. § 172. 
92 See id. § 179. This can be difficult for trustees to adhere to since they have legal title 
to the property. 
9~ See id. §§ 2 cmt. b, 171. 
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 171 (1959). 
95 See id. § 171; DUKEMINIER &jOHANSON, supra note 76, at 178. 
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTS § 171 (1992); DUKEMINIER &jOHANSON, supra 
note 76, at 178-79. 
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If the basic common law trust principles were to apply to the 
NRD trustee provisions of the federal statutes, the Congress that 
passed the statute would be the settlor, or creator of the trust.97 The 
appointed federal or state government agency, or Indian tribe would 
be the trustee.98 The beneficiaries of the trust can be identified as 
members of the public, likely any United States citizen since natural 
resources are ignorant of state boundaries.99 The trust corpus would 
be the money recovered from responsible parties through litiga-
tion. lOO The question remains, however, whether Congress intended 
these basic common law principles of trust to apply in the NRD provi-
sions of CERCLA, CWA, and OPA. 
B. Public Trust Doctrine 
Although it is unclear to what extent Congress intended common 
law trust principles to apply to NRD provisions, it is clear that the trus-
tee provisions of CERCLA, CWA, and OPA find roots in the public 
trust doctrine.101 In the context of the public trust doctrine, trustees, 
which are generally states, are not impressed with fiduciary duties 
identical to those imposed by common law; states as trustees of natu-
ral resources are not held to the highest fiduciary duty known at law, 
since the public trust doctrine does not require absolute protection of 
all trust resources,l°2 Variations of the public trust are permissible, 
although a careful fiduciary balancing process is required of the gov-
ernment trustees.103 A legislature cannot simply override the public 
trust protection.104 Instead, courts require a substantive, rather than 
procedural, trust balance under traditional equity standards.l°5 In 
Paepke v. Building Commission,lo6 for example, the Illinois Supreme 
Court implied that a government wishing to alter public trust re-
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 107(f) (1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(1) (1959). 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 107(f); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(3) (1959). 
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(4) (1959). Did Congress intend to limit 
beneficiaries to citizens of the United States? To members of a local community that is 
affected by the damage to natural resources? Questions such as this are not answered by 
CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 107(f). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 107(f); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(2) (1959). 
101 See Chase, supra note 5, at 354, 379; Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May Be Silly, 
But It's an Answer: The Need to Accept Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource 
Damage Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 48, 54 (1999). 
102 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 6, at 995. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 995, 998. 
105 See id. at 995. 
106 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970). 
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sources bears the burden of showing that it has struck a balance be-
tween its trust obligations and other economic or legislative mo-
tives.l°7 The government, in its role as trustee, comes before the court 
as a fiduciary subject to special scrutiny, and less deserving of the def-
erence given the government in its other capacities. lo8 The court then 
affords the public trust's long-term legacy great weight, and any de-
parture from such legacy would bear the burden of persuasion.l09 
The plain language and legislative history of CERCLA, CWA, and 
OPA NRD provisions imply that the meaning of the words "trust" and 
"trustee" derive from the concepts of state and federal public trust.110 
Unfortunately, the statutes are silent regarding the definition of the 
trustees' fiduciary duty, and it is not readily apparent whether Con-
gress intended NRD trustees to be subject to the same standards as 
trustees under the public trust doctrine.111 
III. THE INDIAN TRUST DOCTRINE: AN EXAMPLE OF GOVERNMENT AS 
TRUSTEE 
The idea of the federal government serving as trustee for natural 
resource damages has not been fully explored in litigation,112 but 
there have been analogous situations in which the United States gov-
ernment has acted as trustee that could help shed light on the con-
cept. One such situation is the federal government's role as trustee on 
behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes, an enlightening scenario 
because Indian trust law is the closest cousin to the public trust doc-
trine, in which the NRD provisions are rooted.l13 Furthermore, Indian 
trust law is a particularly good analogy to shed light on the role of 
NRD trustees because currently, environmental threats to tribal land 
bases are the most pressing issues under the doctrine.1l4 Indian liti-
gants have successfully invoked the Indian trust doctrine to force the 
executive branch of the federal government to live up to its trust re-
sponsibility in matters such as considering Indian interests when allo-
107 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 6, at 998. 
108 See id. at 998-99. 
109 See id. at 998. 
110 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 422. 
111 See id. 
112 See George, supra note 17, at 633. 
m See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust 
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1565 (1994). 
114 See id. at 1474. 
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cating water rights;1l5 cleaning up pollution on Indian reservations;116 
protecting Indian lands against trespassers and infringing develop-
ment;ll7 preventing improper conveyance of Indian lands;118 and 
compensating for natural resource mismanagement.119 
The current status of the government's Indian trust responsibility 
is certainly not one of a clear common law fiduciary duty.12o It does, 
however, find certain reference points in the common law.121 For ex-
ample, defining the trust duty depends upon the branch of govern-
ment against which the responsibility is being enforced; courts have 
been reluctant to hold that the trust duty constrains congressional 
action, and have even held that Congress has the power to terminate 
the Indian trust.122 This is because at common law, the settlor, or crea-
tor of the trust, has the power to alter and even end the trust, regard-
less of the impact on the beneficiary.123 So, ''while courts recognize 
that Congress has a trust responsibility, they uniformly regard it as 
essentially a moral obligation, without justiciable standards for its en-
forcement."124 Even though the Supreme Court established a standard 
that limits Congress's power,125 the standard, similar to a rational basis 
review in constitutional law, is so loose that it effectively did little to 
change previous court opinions that set standards of great deference 
to Congress.126 
The executive branch, on the other hand, would be the trustee in 
a common law trust paradigm, and consequently has been held to 
115 Id. at 1513-14 (citing Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. 
Supp. 252, 256-57 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
116Id. (citing Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Mfarrs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1096 
(8th Cir. 1989)). 
117 Id. (citing North Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 I.'tdian L. Rep. 3065, 3067-71 (D. 
Mont. 1985)). 
118 Wood, supra note 113, at 1513-14 (citing Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 
110,113 (1919)). 
119 Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 681 
(1987)). 
120 See Kathleen M. 0 'Sullivan, Comment, What Would John Marshall Say? Does the Federal 
Trust Responsibility Protect Tribal Gambling Revenue?, 84 GEO. LJ. 123, 134 (1995). 
121 See Wood, supra note 113, at 1512-13. 
122 See id. 
123 Seeid. 
124Id. 
125 "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Con-
gress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be dis-
turbed." O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 134 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 
(1974)). 
126 See id. 
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more than a mere moral obligation.127 In United States v. Mitchell,128 
[hereinafter Mitchell 11] the Supreme Court found that Indians could 
legally enforce a trust responsibility129 against the federal executive 
branch.I30 This interpretation, though, was not the Supreme Court's 
original conclusion.131 In an earlier version of Mitchell v. United 
States,132 [hereinafter Mitchell 1] the Court had rejected a tribe's claim 
for money damages under the General Allotment Act, reasoning that 
the Act "created only a limited trust relationship between the United 
States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Gov-
ernment to manage timber resources. "133 On remand, the Court of 
Claims examined several timber management statutes apart from the 
General Allotment Act, and ruled that they imposed a fiduciary duty 
on the executive branch of the federal government.134 
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of 
Claim's conclusion, and held that the federal government did have a 
fiduciary duty toward the Indians under the timber management stat-
utes. 135 It noted that the Quinault reservation had been allotted in 
trust to individual tribe members.I36 The Tribe and its individual 
members had sued the federal government for mismanagement of 
forest resources on the reservation.I37 The executive branch was im-
plicated through Interior, which had been responsible for managing 
the forest resources.138 
In its analysis, the Court applied a three-part test that addressed 
the issue of legislative intent to create a right and a remedy in regard 
to the Tribe's collection of monetary damages for the government's 
127 See id. at 134-35. 
128 463 u.s. 206 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II] . 
129 Tribes can enforce the federal fiduciary duty and obtain equitable, declaratory, or 
mandamus relief in a federal district court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). Wood, supra note 113, at 1514-15. Before the enactment of the APA, "questions of 
sovereign immunity posed initial barriers to litigation and likely hampered tribes from 
fully employing the trust doctrine as a claim for relief against federal agency transgres-
sions." Id. 
130 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224-27; see also O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135. 
m See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 134 n.84 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 445 U.S. 
535 (1980». 
132 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter Mitchell I]. 
mId. at 542. 
134 See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 134 n.84. 
135 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983). 
136 See id. at 208-10; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135. 
m See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135. 
1~8 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219-20; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135 n.87. 
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breach of its fiduciary duty.139 The three factors were: (1) a tribe must 
base its claim on a substantive right found in the Constitution or a 
federal statute, or created by the assumption of federal control over 
Indian property; (2) the claim must be for money damages; and (3) 
the claimant must demonstrate that the law creating the substantive 
right "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the 
Federal Government for the damage sustained."l40 
The Court, applying the test to the Quinaults' claim in Mitchell II, 
found that the Tribe had a substantive right based on both the timber 
statutes and the assumption of elaborate federal control.l41 The Court 
found two sources of fiduciary duty: it first held that the executive 
branch must exercise fiduciary care when a trust relationship is clear 
from congressional enactments, and relied on the standards for fed-
eral management of Indian timber set out in the multiple timber 
management statutes and administrative regulations.142 Second, the 
Court found that a fiduciary relationship had necessarily arisen when 
the government assumed "such elaborate control over forests and 
property belonging to Indians. "143 The Court further held that Inte-
rior's regulations, which were comprehensive and had been revised 
several times, imposed fiduciary duties upon the agency, as did the 
139 See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135,138. 
140 Id. at 135 (citing Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 217). Critics of Mitchell II point out that the 
decision conflicts with the Court's opinion in the 1975 case of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975). In Cort, the Court created a stringent, four-part test for implying a private cause of 
action from federal statutes that do not explicitly grant one. The factors of the test are: (1) 
whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; 
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) whether the cause 
of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to 
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. Id. at 78; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 
138 n.l09. Even though the Mitchell II Court did not apply the Cort v. Ash four-part test, the 
test created addresses the same fundamental issue-legislative intent to create a private 
right and remedy. O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 138. 
141 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224-25; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135. 
142 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 222-24 (1983); O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135-36; 
Wood, supra note 113, at 1519-20. 
143 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. Indeed, the federal government did exercise elabo-
rate control; until 1910, the federal government did not allow Indians the right to sell 
timber from reservation land, and the 1910 Act gave the Secretary of the Interior "the 
right to sell timber from the reservation land, the right to use the money from timber sales 
for the benefit ofIndians, and the right to consent to sales by Indian allottees." O'Sullivan, 
supra note 120, at 136 (citing Act of June 25, 1910, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 857 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407 (1994)). 
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requirement that the Secretary of the Interior consider "the needs 
and best interests ofthe Indian owner and his heirs."144 
The Court in Mitchell II never explicitly stated on what substantive 
right the Tribe's claim was based, but rather "implicitly stated a sub-
stantive right of Indians to be protected from an executive branch 
agency's breach of its fiduciary duty."145 The source of this fiduciary 
duty arose from the pervasive federal involvement in tribal forestry 
management; it did not seem to be inherent in the federal-tribal rela-
tionship.I46 As for the Tribe's entitlement to compensation for the 
government's breach, the Court found that the statutes and regula-
tions at issue could be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation 
because they clearly established fiduciary obligations on the part of 
the government in the management and operation of Indian lands 
and resources.I47 Unlike the Mitchell I Court, which would have al-
lowed compensation only where the law creating the substantive right 
expressly mandated it,I48 the Mitchell II Court found an implied right 
of damages under the regulatory scheme based on precedents from 
the Court of Claims that allowed implied rights of action for Indi-
ans,I49 and on an analogy to the common law of trusts. 150 
The Mitchell II decision does have some problematic features, in-
cluding a lack of clarity in the scope of its holding. I51 The Court seem-
ingly created a rule of liability without manageable standards because 
it failed to set parameters on how extensive a statute must be in detail-
ing governmental duties in order for a court to find a claim for 
money damages.I52 Critics also find the holding problematic because 
of its reference to the Quinault's lack of education, and because it 
144 O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 135-36 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1994». 
145 Id. at 136. 
146 Id. 
147 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 136. The Court con-
trasted these statutes and regulations with the "bare trust" created by the General Allot-
mentAct. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224; O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 136 .. 
148 See Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). 
149 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 217n.16 (1983); O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137. 
150 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-
212 (1959) for proposition that, at common law, trustee's breach of fiduciary duty 
naturally leads to liability); O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137. The Court also seems to take 
into account the fact that many Quinaults lacked education, and were absentee owners, un-
aware of the exact physical location of their allotments. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 227; 
O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137. 
15\ See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137. 
152 See id. 
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relies on common law trust principles even though the Court has con-
sistently found the federal-tribal trust relationship to be unique.153 
Despite the confusion surrounding Mitchell II, the case demon-
strates that common law principles of trust can apply when the federal 
government acts as trustee.154 Perhaps the most obvious indication 
that the federal government has a fiduciary duty in the realm of In-
dian trust law, and that the Indians have a right to enforce it, is the 
current "Indian Trust Suit," Cobell v. Norton.l55 As a result of Interior's 
alleged mismanagement of Indian trust funds for years, 300,000 
American Indians have sued the federal government for breach of its 
fiduciary duty.156 Were there no fiduciary duty on the part of the fed-
eral government, the plaintiffs in this case would not have a cause of 
action.157 
IV. PAST AND CURRENT NRD LITIGATION 
Very few cases have been litigated under the CERCLA, CWA, and 
OPA NRD provisions. Most of the controversy that has found its way 
into a courtroom has focused on the methodology the trustee used to 
perform damage assessment.l58 This section looks at the history of 
courts' decisions that have granted NRD trustees typical agency defer-
ence instead of holding them to a stricter fiduciary standard. It then 
examines one case where a court allowed an environmental group to 
intervene in NRD proceedings to prevent a settlement between the 
trustee and a PRP that was not in the public's best interest. 
A. Courts Afford Great Deference to NRD Trustees 
According to the language of CERCLA's NRD provision, the gov-
ernment does have a duty to commence at least a damages assessment 
when there has been injury to natural resources: the President and 
Governor "shall designate" officials to act as trustees, and those 
officials "shall assess damages" to natural resources.l59 The provision 
does not clarifY whether the trustees have an obligation, in their 
fiduciary capacity, to pursue damages to restore natural resources, 
153 See id. 
154 See 463 U.S. at 206. 
155 2001 WL 173299 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
156 See John Gibeaut, Another Broken Trust, A.BA. j., Sept. 1999, at 40-44. 
157 See gmerally Norton, 2001 WL 173299. 
158 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 419 n.45. 
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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and whether the trustees have the option of settling with PRPs.160 Fur-
thermore, the provision leaves unclear whether or not it is a violation 
of the trustees' fiduciary duty not to take action beyond the point of 
assessing damages.161 CERCLA also fails to provide guidance for situa-
tions where reality conflicts with the statutory purpose-for example, 
when trustees simply do not have access to adequate funds to pay for 
an initial site assessment.162 
1. Cases Establish Deference to Trustees 
If a government trustee plans to pursue damages after an initial 
site assessment, the question must be explored whether the trustee, 
such as Interior, has a duty to seek damages for restoration purposes, 
or whether it may pursue a cheaper alternative.l63 When Interior 
originally promulgated rules governing NRD trustee action, it created 
a rule stating that trustees under the CERCLA NRD provision were 
allowed to seek recovery for the lesser of the cost of restoring the in-
jured resource or the lost use value of the resource.l64 However, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the rule invalid in Ohio v. United 
States Department of Interior. 165 That court stated that the relevant CER-
CLA provisions demonstrated that "Congress established a distinct 
preference for restoration costs as the measure of recovery in [NRD] 
cases. "166 Before environmentalists could declare victory, though, the 
court went on to explain that Interior could sometimes take into ac-
count other factors.l67 For example, when restoration is physically im-
possible or the cost is grossly disproportionate to the lost use value, 
Interior may seek damages for lost use value168 of the resources in-
stead of restoration cost.169 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollu-
tion, 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989); Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 428 n.89. 
163 See grmerally Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996); State of Ohio v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. 
Cir.1989). 
164 See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441,459. 
165 See id. at 481. 
166 Id. at 459. 
167 See id. 
168 Lost use value encompasses the human economic harm stemming from loss of 
natural resources, such as loss of timber or harvestable species of fish. See Plater, supra note 
6, at 222-23; Anderson, supra note 1, at 407. 
169 See State of Ohio v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 880 F.2d 432, 441, 459 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
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Even though the Ohio court invalidated the "lesser of' rule, trus-
tees are still left with plenty of choices in seeking damages for harm to 
natural resources, and in how to use the recovered funds. 170 CERCLA 
allows for recovery of damages that shall be used "to restore, replace 
or acquire the equivalent of' the affected natural resources. l7l In Kenne-
cott Utah Copper Corporation v. United States Department of Interior,172 the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard several challenges to Interior's 
regulations concerning assessment of NRDs.173 Petitioner Montana 
argued that CERCLA requires trustees to prefer "restoration" and 
"rehabilitation" of natural resources over the "acquisition of equiva-
lent resources" because the former result in a net benefit to the na-
tion's natural resources whereas acquiring equivalent resources simply 
transfers into public ownership uninjured resources that are compa-
rable to the injured resources.174 Under Interior regulations, trustees 
are required to consider cost in implementing the most appropriate 
remedial strategy)75 The court concluded that Montana's argument 
may have merit as policy, but that under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,176 Interior's interpretation is permissible)77 
The court found that Congress had not clearly expressed a preference 
for restoration/rehabilitation over replacement/acquisition.178 The 
court did not analyze Congress's choice of the word "trustee," and so 
did not consider whether to apply a fiduciary standard instead of the 
typical deference standard to agencies.179 
170 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 88 F.3d 1191, 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ohio 880 F.2d at 459. 
171 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
172 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
173 See id. at 1199. 
174 See id. at 1229. 
175 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.81; Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1229. 
176 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron set a precedent of great deference to administrative 
agency decision making. See id. 
177 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 88 F.3d 1191, 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
178 See id. Interior uses "restoration" and "rehabilitation" as synonyms, defining them as 
"actions undertaken to return injured resources to their baseline condition." 43 C.F.R. 
§ 11.82(b)(I)(i). It defines "replacement" and "acquisition of the equivalent" as synony-
mous, meaning "the substitution for injured resources with resources that provide the 
same or substantially similar services." 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(b) (1) (ii); see Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 
1229. 
179 See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1191. 
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In Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni,IBO the First Circuit discussed the 
difference betw'een restoration and replacement/acquisition. IBI In 
Puerto Rico, an oil tanker ran aground on a reef three and a half miles 
off the south coast of Puerto Rico,1B2 In order to refloat the vessel, the 
captain ordered the crew to dump more than 5,000 tons of crude oil 
into the water,1B3 The court allowed the government to seek NRDs 
under a state statute analogous to the NRD provisions of the CWAIB4 
The First Circuit judges decided, in light of the NRD provisions of the 
CWA, that Congress had intended for NRD recovery instead of merely 
recovery for the loss of market value of the affected real estate,1B5 
However, after examining the legislative history of the CWA's NRD 
provisions, it went on to infer a reasonableness standardIB6 that should 
dictate a trustee's determination of what type of restoration damages 
to seek,1B7 It explained that acquiring resources to offset the loss 
could include acquisition of comparable lands for public parks, or 
reforestation of a similar proximate site where the presence of oil 
would not pose the same hazard to ultimate success. IBB It continued by 
stating that as with restoration damages, damages awarded for alterna-
tive measures should be reasonable and not grossly disproportionate 
to the harm caused. IB9 The Puerto Rico court's interpretation might 
have moved beyond Congress's intent by holding that funds could be 
180 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
181 See id. at 676-77. 
182 See id. at 656. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. at 670-74. 
185 See id. at 674. 
186 The court articulated factors that a reasonable and prudent trustee of the envi-
ronment would consider in its steps to mitigate harm caused by pollution: technical feasi-
bility, harmful side effects, compatibility with or duplication of such regeneration as is to 
be naturally expected, and the extent to which efforts beyond a certain point would be-
come either redundant or disproportionately expensive. See Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colo-
cotroni, 628 F.2d 657, 675 (1st Cir. 1980). 
187 See id. at 675. 
188 See id. at 676. 
189 See id. The court applied the standard to reject a $7 million proposal to remove 
damaged trees and oil-impregnated sediments from a large area and replace them with 
clean sediment and container-grown trees, stating that no reasonable trustee of the envi-
ronment would have pursued such a plan. See id. It next rejected a $5 million plan related 
to the replacement value of the living creatures destroyed or damaged by the oil spill as 
also being unreasonable. See id. at 676-77. Finally, it remanded the case to the District 
Court for further consideration, urging the parties to consider the option of alternative 
site restoration. See id. at 678. 
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spent on projects that have no direct relationship to the damaged re-
sources, such as building public parks elsewhere.190 
In sum, courts have decided that trustees should seek damages 
for restoration instead of lost use value, unless restoration would be 
impossible or the cost of restoration is grossly disproportionate to the 
lost use value of the resources.191 However, when a trustee pursues 
restoration damages, the trustee can decide, based on cost, whether 
to seek damages in an amount that can be used to attempt to restore 
the natural resources to their pre-damaged state, or to acquire the 
equivalent of the damaged natural resources by buying up land or by 
other means.192 As there are still relatively few cases concerning NRD 
trustees, it remains to be seen how broadly the term "acquiring the 
equivalent of' will be defined.193 It also remains to be seen how 
"grossly disproportionate" recovery costs have to be before trustees 
can recover for lost use value instead of restoration. 194 
A final factor in the equation, which may cause trustees to delay 
assessment and ultimately not to seek damages, is that under CER-
CIA, NRDs are residual to cleanup.195 Cleanup work by EPA or re-
sponsible parties could significantly restore injured natural resources 
to their pre-damaged condition, thus eliminating the need for trus-
tees to step in at all.196 Even if the damage to natural resources is not 
completely or significantly restored by cleanup, common sense dic-
tates that the trustees should not do a damage assessment until the 
remedial work has been completed, or the effects of the remedial 
work become apparent.197 
Courts have interpreted the statutes to allow trustees a significant 
amount of discretion.198 It seems, at times, that they can consider the 
190 See Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 678; Murray et al., supra note 14, at 433. 
191 See Ohio v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
192 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 88 F.3d 1191, 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 675-76. 
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994). 
194 See id. Trustees, as part of the government, may often be under political pressure to 
maintain good favor with industry by seeking lost use damages instead of the more expen-
sive restoration damages. See id. 
195 See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 152-53. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 
1191,1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 657, 673-74 
(1st Cir. 1980). 
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interests of those other than the public, the named beneficiary of the 
trust. 199 
2. NRD Trustees in Practice 
Ohio and Kennecott establish that money collected in NRD cases 
does not necessarily have to be applied directly to resource restora-
tion, making the guidelines of expected behavior for a trustee fuzzy. 200 
For example, in 1991, a train derailed near Dunsmuir, California, 
spilling approximately nineteen thousand gallons of the herbicide 
metam sodium into the upper Sacramento River.20l A thirty-eight mil-
lion dollar settlement, fourteen million of which had been obtained 
under CERClA's NRD provision, was deposited in the Canterra Trus-
tee Council's account.202 In 1995, the Canterra Trustee Council an-
nounced that it would use the money to develop natural resource res-
toration projects in other areas of the state, although projects 
affecting the upper Sacramento River would be given a higher prior-
ity.203 Apparently, no member of the public or any environmental or-
ganization assumed the role of a trust beneficiary, and therefore, no 
attempt was made to enjoin the Canterra Trustee Council from using 
the trust corpus in this manner. 204 
An example on a larger scale can be found in the case of the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, where an oil tanker sliced in to a submerged 
reef and spilled nearly eleven million gallons of crude oil into Prince 
William Sound off the coast of Alaska.205 Six NRD trustees repre-
sented the United States and the State of Alaska to bring suit under 
the CERClA and CWA NRD provisions, garnering a nine hundred 
million dollar settlement from Exxon.206 Ten years later, it is apparent 
that not all the money was used for restoring damaged natural re-
sources.207 
199 See generally Kennecott, 88 F.3d 1191; Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d 652. 
200 See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1229; Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 
459 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Murray et ai., supra note 14, at 424. 
201 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 427 n.83. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
205 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 220. 
206 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 447. 
207 See id. 
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The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (Spill Trustee Coun-
cil) has divided the funds into several categories.208 First, money must 
be used to reimburse federal and state governments for costs incurred 
prior to the settlement, and to reimburse Exxon for cleanup work 
that took place after the settlement.209 Next, the Spill Trustee Council 
has devoted 25.3% of its budget to research, monitoring and restora-
tion.210 The largest portion of the budget, 60%, goes toward habitat 
protection, which the Spill Trustee Council accomplishes by provid-
ing funds to government agencies to acquire title or conservation 
easements on land important for its restoration value.211 The Spill 
Trustee Council has set aside 15.2% of its budget for a reserve fund 
that will support long-term restoration activities after Exxon supplies 
the final payment of the settlement in September 2001.212 Finally, 
4.3% of the budget is devoted to science management, public infor-
mation and administration.213 
As in the case of the Canterra Trustee Council, no member of 
the public has attempted to challenge the Spill Trustee Council's dis-
tribution of funds recovered under CERCLA and CWA NRD provi-
sions. Even if trustees such as the Canterra Trustee Council and the 
Spill Trustee Council theoretically have a fiduciary duty to the public, 
their unchallenged decisions amount to their having virtually com-
plete discretion.214 In the long run, this unchecked power could lead 
to abuse, which will be to the detriment of the already damaged natu-
ral resources.215 The following case, however, demonstrates that there 
is potential for the public, as beneficiary, to intervene in NRD litiga-
tion and enforce trustees' fiduciary duty. 
208 See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee ClJUncil (visited Nov. 20, 1999) <http://Www. oil-
spill.state.ak.us> [hereinafter Exxon Valdez]. 
2Q9 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. These costs include management of the annual work plan and habitat pro-
grams, scientific oversight of research, monitoring and restoration projects, agency coor-
dination, and overall administrative costs including costs of keeping the public informed. 
Seeid. 
214 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 440 n.143. 
215 See id. 
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B. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor 
In In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged 
PCB Pollution,216 the United States and the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts (the sovereigns) brought a claim, inter alia, under CERCLA 
§ 107 for damages to natural resources allegedly caused by the release 
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into New Bedford Harbor.217 The 
proceeding involved an attempt to resolve the liability of one defen-
dant, AVX Corporation, which allegedly caused the release of PCBs 
during its ownership and operation of a capacitor manufacturing 
plant adjacent to New Bedford Harbor.218 On March 4, 1987, the par-
ties filed a settlement agreement of two million dollars and a pro-
posed judgment approving the settlement.219 At that point, the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation (the Federation), representing the interests 
of its members who lived in the New Bedford Harbor area, sought to 
intervene to contest the proposed settlement.220 Among other rights, 
the Federation wanted to brief and argue the appropriate measure of 
natural resource damages under CERCLA.221 The Federation believed 
that the sovereigns had adequately represented its interests until the 
announcement of the proposed settlement, at which point it believed 
the sovereigns had betrayed its interests by accepting such a low set-
tlement figure. 222 Although the sovereigns argued that their ultimate 
goal of cleaning up the harbor was consistent with that of the Federa-
tion, the court granted the Federation's motion to intervene in order 
to promote the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions 
before it.223 
Undoubtedly, AVX was anxious to settle because under CERCLA, 
a judicially approved settlement entitled them to protection from 
contribution liability to non-settlors.224 The sovereigns had little in-
centive to make sure that the settlement was favorable because the 
216 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989). 
217 See id. at 1022. 
218 See id. 
219Id. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. at 1024. The Federation sought only the right to brief and argue several is-
sues. It diq not seek to participate in discovery, the examination of witnesses, or the taking 
or contesting of evidence. Id. at 1023. 
222 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollu-
tion, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1024 (D. Mass. 1989). 
22S See id. at 1024-25. The court also noted that the expertise of the Federation would 
help guide the court through the extremely complex matter before it. See id. at 1025. 
224 See id. at 1026; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2) (1994). 
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settlement would only reduce the potential liability of others by the 
amount of the settlement.225 The court, therefore, had the important 
task of ensuring that the settlement was "fair, adequate, and reason-
able, and consistent with the Constitution and the mandate of Con-
gress" before granting its approva1.226 The Federation argued that the 
proposed settlement violated the mandate of Congress because it vio-
lated the NRD settlement provision of CERClA.227 The court held 
that, contrary to the Federation's position, the Congressional man-
date was satisfied because the CERClA settlement provision does not 
require recovery of the full restoration and replacement of the in-
jured natural resources.228 The court stated that it was not required to 
ensure that the sovereigns had negotiated the best deal possible, and 
that the settlement was "fair, reasonable, and in the public interest. "229 
"When the natural resource damages were later revealed to be close to 
seventy million dollars, therefore, nothing could be done. 23o The 
court addressed the possibility that damages would later be revealed 
to be much higher than the settlement agreed upon, and stated that it 
was not disturbed by the fact that AVX may have caused the most pol-
lution.231 Instead, the court took the position that AVX deserved a 
225 See In re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1026. 
226Id. at 1027. Factors for the court to consider in deciding whether to approve a set-
tlement include: a comparison of the strengths of plaintiffs' case versus the amount of the 
settlement offer; the likely complexity, length, and expense of the litigation; the amount of 
opposition to the settlement among affected parties; the opinion of competent counsel; 
and, the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery already undertaken at the 
time of the settlement. See id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 
884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
227 See id. at 1032-33. In 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1994), section 9622(j) (2) provides: 
An agreement under this section may contain a covenant not to sue under 
section 9607 (a) (4) (C) of this title for damages to natural resources under the 
trusteeship of the United States resulting from the release or threatened re-
lease of hazardous substances that is the subject of the agreement, but only if 
the Federal natural resource trustee has agreed in writing to such covenant. 
The Federal natural resource trustee may agree to such covenant if the po-
tentially responsible party agrees to undertake appropriate actions necessary 
to protect and restore the natural resources damaged by such release or 
threatened release of hazardous substances. 
42 U.S.C. § 9622(j) (2); seeln re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1032-33. 
228 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollu-
tion, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1033 (D. Mass. 1989). 
229 Id. at 1031. 
230 See id. at 1031,1032; Murray et al., supra note 14, at 428 n.89. 
231 See In re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1032. 
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break for being the first to enter into settlement negotiations well in 
advance of the trial. 232 
Even though the Federation was not ultimately successful, the 
case is significant because the court implicitly recognized that mem-
bers of the public, as beneficiaries, have a right to intervene in NRD 
proceedings in an attempt to force the NRD trustee to consider the 
public's best interest. 233 
V. COURTS SHOULD FIND THAT NRD TRUSTEES HAVE A FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 
The NRD provisions of CERCLA, CWA, and OPA are statutory 
causes of action, which means that their interpretation need not mir-
ror common law precedents.234 A motivating force behind the CER-
CLA NRD provisions was Congress's dissatisfaction with the common 
law's inability to measure loss other than market value.235 Yet, when 
Congress created this revolutionary cause of action, it gave the power 
to bring NRD claims exclusively to state and federal trustees of natural 
resources who would act on behalf of the public, or to designated 
trustees of Indian tribes.236 In other words, Congress created a trust.237 
Because the subject matter concerns natural resources that belong to 
all, this trust finds its roots in the public trust doctrine.238 Therefore, 
it would be logical to turn to public trust doctrine jurisprudence to 
interpret the CERCLA, CWA, and OPA NRD provisions. However, 
while the public trust doctrine is "a cornerstone of environmental and 
public lands law, [it] labors under an overriding ambiguity and obscu-
rity that hinders its effective application. "239 It makes sense, then, to 
look also to Indian trust law, the public trust doctrine's closest cousin, 
for guidance in how federal statutory NRD trustees should act. 240 
This section will first examine the problems with trying to hold 
NRD trustees to a fiduciary standard in light of the incomplete draft-
ing of the statutory provisions and the current precedent granting 
232 See id. 
233 See id. at 1022-26. 
234 O'Connor, supra note 38, at 149. 
235 See id. (citing Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 455 (D.C. Cir. 
1989»; Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 657, 673-74 (1st Cir. 1980). 
236 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994). 
237 See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 149-50. 
238 See Chase, supra note 5, at 354. 
239 Wood, supra note 113, at 1565. 
240 See id. 
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deference to trustees. It then looks at the similarities between federal 
statutory NRD provisions and Indian trust law, and argues that courts 
should hold NRD trustees to a similar fiduciary duty to which the 
Mitchell II Court held federal executive branch Indian trustees. 
A. Difficulty in Identifying What Would Constitute a Breach o/Fiduciary 
Duty: Inherent Ambiguities in the NRD Trustee System 
Instead of holding federal statutory NRD trustees to a strict 
fiduciary duty, courts have granted them agency deference.241 One 
argument for imposing a fiduciary duty on NRD trustees, thereby 
eliminating this standard of deference, is to increase public account-
ability.242 Today, public accountability is severely lacking because the 
deference standard makes it nearly impossible to identify cases where 
trustees' activities violate the bounds of the statutory authority under 
which they act. Ohio and Kennecott have blurred the lines in NRD cases 
concerning the meaning of natural resource restoration, leaving the 
door wide open for trustees to make decisions about restoration that 
may not live up to the public's expectations.243 Of course, if a trustee 
used recovered funds to increase general government funds, without 
contributing a cent toward restoration, this would be a clear violation 
of its fiduciary duty and Congress's intent.244 As soon as the trustee 
makes even the most minimal effort to restore, though, any further 
attempt to delineate the statutes invokes uncertainty.245 
For example, the 1991 train wreck near Dunsmuir, California, 
that resulted in a chemical spill into the upper Sacramento River, put 
fourteen million dollars into the pockets of the Canterra Trustee 
Council to use for restoration.246 In 1995, the Canterra Trustee Coun-
cil announced that it would use the money to develop natural re-
source restoration projects in other areas of the state, although proj-
ects affecting the upper Sacramento River would be given a higher 
priority.247 Here it can be argued that the Canterra Trustee Council's 
actions fall under the permissible conduct of replacement/acquisition 
241 See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 
1191,1224,1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
242 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 466. 
243 See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1229; Ohio, 880 F.2d at 459. 
244 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 433. 
245 [d. at 433-34. 
246 See id. at 427 n.83. 
247 See id. 
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discussed in Puerto RicO.248 The Council could argue that restoration 
of the upper Sacramento River was not feasible, that restoration 
would result in harmful side effects, or that their efforts would be re-
dundant or disproportionately expensive.249 If any of these arguments 
were valid, spending the trust money to restore losses in other areas 
would be a legally acceptable action.250 
The best example of the futility in trying to identify where an 
NRD trustee has violated the bounds of the statutory authority, and 
thus violated its fiduciary duty, is found in the case of the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill.251 The Spill Trustee Council recovered nine hundred 
million dollars from the settlement of a suit under the CERClA and 
CWA NRD provisions.252 Due to the magnitude of the disaster, the 
Spill Trustee Council used the money for a variety of purposes, but it 
is unclear whether all the uses were for the end result of natural re-
source restoration.253 
There are several ways in which the Spill Trustee Council might 
have spent funds in violation of the statutes that allowed recovery.254 
The Spill Trustee Council has funded several monitoring and re-
search projects, including some that would normally be funded by 
agencies such as Alaska Department of Fish and Game.255 The Spill 
Trustee Council has also purchased 456,000 acres of land at a price 
higher than market value, believing that the acquisition would pro-
vide a degree of protection and public access otherwise not avail-
able.256 In addition, the Spill Trustee Council established a four and 
one half million dollar fund to restore and protect waterways across 
the United States, and spent over $26 million in support of the Alaska 
SeaLife Center.257 
248 See Puerto Rico v. s.s. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1980); 
Murray et al., supra note 14, at 427 n.83 .. 
249 See Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 675. 
250 Seeid. 
251 See PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6, at 220. 
252 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 447. 
25' See Exxon Valdez, supra note 208. 
254 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 447-49. 
255 See id. at 447-48. Projects included sockeye salmon and killer whale projects that 
were routinely required by Alaska harvest management programs and thus should have 
been funded by Alaska Department of Fish and Game. The Spill Trustee Council also 
funded a study examining the effects of oil exposure on embryonic development of pink 
salmon (not genetically identical to the pink salmon in Prince William Sound) in south-
east Alaska, which is outside the spill area. Id. at 448. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. at 449. Former EPA Administrator Carol Browner announced in March 1997 
that Exxon funds would be used to restore forested buffers in the Anacostia River water-
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A closer look, however, reveals that these uses of funds arguably 
all fall within statutorily permissible uses.258 First, the land acquisitions 
were arguably a misuse of the settlement funds because the Spill Trus-
tee Council paid too much for the land.259 While this may be so, it is 
important to distinguish the question of whether the Spill Trustee 
Council breached its fiduciary duty, if it has one, from whether it 
overstepped the bounds of the NRD statutory provisions. In the case 
of the latter, the Spill Trustee Council was comfortably within the let-
ter of the law, based on the Puerto Rico court's holding that acquisition 
of comparable lands is permissible, and possibly preferable to restora-
tion in areas where ultimate success is uncertain.260 This, then, is an 
excellent example of where the public would be better served by the 
judiciary holding NRD trustees to a standard of fiduciary care instead 
of the traditional agency deference granted by the Puerto Rico and 
Kmnecott courts.261 The trustees would have violated a fiduciary duty 
by paying too much for the land, and perhaps by acquiring the land at 
all. 
Another gray area is the use of funds to restore and protect wa-
terways across the United States. Technically, this use does not violate 
a statute because the money was a reimbursement to EPA for costs 
incurred during cleanup of the spill prior to settlement.262 
Arguably, the Spill Trustee Council's use of over twenty-six mil-
lion dollars in support of the Alaska SeaLife Center263 is the one glar-
ing example of money spent on purposes outside the confines of the 
CERCIA and CWA NRD provisions. However, before concluding that 
the Spill Trustee Council has violated its fiduciary duty as trustee, an-
other explanation should be considered. The last sentence of CER-
CIA § 107 (f), "The measure of damages in any action ... shall not be 
limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such re-
sources, "264 means that trustees may recover more money than is actu-
shed in Maryland, and in September 1997 that funds would be used to prevent pollution 
of the waters in and around New York City. See id. 
258 See Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1980). 
259 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 448-49. 
260 See Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 675-76. 
261 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 88 F.3d 1191, 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 675-76. 
262 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 449. 
263 See Exxon Valdez, supra note 208.The Center is a fifty-five million dollar facility com-
bining three main missions: providing public education about the marine environment, 
maintaining the best marine research facilities in the north Pacific, and offering animal 
rehabilitation for injured marine mammals and seabirds. See id. 
264 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994). 
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ally needed to restore damaged natural resources.265 This portion of 
the statute allows NRD trustees to recover damages in an amount that 
exceeds the cost of restoring or replacing resources, thus recognizing 
that a trustee may "recover damages not only to restore an injured 
resource physically, but also to compensate the public for the lost use 
of resources during the interim period between the discharge of haz-
ardous substances and the final implementation of a remedial 
plan. "266 Recovered damages under this portion of the statute are sur-
plus to the cost of actual restoration and trustees can spend the extra 
money they collect without further Congressional authorization or 
appropriation.267 Thus, the Spill Trustee Council's contribution to-
ward the creation of the Alaska SeaLife Center might be justified as a 
use of excess funds recovered to compensate the public.268 
The legal ambiguity that prevents a clear understanding of 
whether a trustee such as the Spill Trustee Council is exceeding the 
bounds of statutory authority and/or is violating its fiduciary duty to 
the public, also prevents observers from being able to discern 
whether the trustee itself seems to be acting under the belief that it 
has a fiduciary duty to the public. In sum, the CERClA, CWA, and 
OPA NRD trustee provisions may have originally been drafted with 
intent for the trustees to have a fiduciary duty to the public. Along the 
way, though, courts seem to have lost sight of that goal, and granted 
federal executive branch NRD trustees deference instead of holding 
them to a stricter fiduciary duty.269 
B. Indian Trust Law Sheds Light 
Despite the fact that courts have made it difficult to identity when 
an NRD trustee may have breached its fiduciary duty,270 it is not hard 
265 See id. 
266 Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1229. 
'1.67 See Murray et aI., supra note 14, at 426 (citing Superfund Reautlwrization and Reform 
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 2727 Befure the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Env't of the House 
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Congo 239, 239 (1998) (statement of Richard 
Stewart, Professor. New York University School of Law) ). 
268 See id. The Center serves as a tourist attraction that helps to boost the local econ-
omy. and as a center for research related to the oil spill. See Exxon Valdez, supra note 208. 
Both purposes seem to be a reasonable way to compensate the people of Alaska for their 
lost use of natural resources. See id. 
'1.69 See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 
1191, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Puerto Ricov. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1980). 
270 See generally In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged 
PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989); Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 652. 
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to imagine a situation in which such a case might arise. For example, 
a trustee could settle with a PRP for an amount obviously too low, or 
could refuse to spend any of the recovered funds on restoring dam-
aged natural resources, instead using the money for other pur-
poses.271 Two questions arise when considering such hypothetical 
situations. The first is whether a citizen could bring a lawsuit, or inter-
vene in a lawsuit or settlement negotiations between the government 
trustee and PRPs, to force the government either to pursue a suit for 
NRDs or to prevent an inadequate settlement. The answer to this 
question seems to be affirmative, since the National Wildlife Federa-
tion did just that in the New Bedford Harbor case.272 The second 
question is whether a citizen can sue for damages under the theory 
that he has been harmed by the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. It 
may be that when Congress created NRD trustees, it did not intend 
the word trustee to carry the common law meaning,273 but instead 
meant it to mean something more symbolic. The case law where 
courts granted deference to agencies that act as trustees supports this 
notion.274 However, drawing a comparison to the area of Indian trust 
law275 reveals several factors that support finding some level of an en-
forceable fiduciary duty in regard to NRDs, a breach of which would 
support a private cause of action for damages.276 
Mitchell II established that the United States was accountable in 
money damages for alleged breaches of trust in connection with its 
management of forest resources277 on allotted lands of the Quinault 
271 These hypothetical situations are only a step removed from actual cases. In the New 
Bedford Harbor case, Interior settled with defendant AVX for an amount later proven to 
be too low, and in the case of Canterra Trustee Council, the Trustee Council used recov-
ered funds to help pay for other projects. See In re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1019; Murray 
et al., supra note 14, at 427 n.83. 
272 See In re Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1019. 
27S See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959). Common law trustees are 
subject to the highest fiduciary duty known at law. See id. 
274 See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 
1191, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Puerto Rico, 628 F.2d at 675-76. 
275 See Wood, supra note 113, at 1505. The analogy makes even more sense today than 
it might have fifty years ago, because the modern role of federal protection is to shield 
Indian lands from environmental threats. See id. Thus, not only do the Indian and NRD 
trustees share a similar relationship of trust between agency and public, but they are now 
engaging in substantively similar work. See id. 
276 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983). 
277 Id. at 210. The respondents claimed that the government: (1) failed to obtain a fair 
market value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) 
failed to obtain any payment at all for some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a 
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Indian Reservation.278 The timber statutes and regulations upon 
which the Indians relied clearly gave the government full responsibil-
ity to manage Indian resources and land for the Indians' benefit.279 
Therefore, the Court found that these timber statutes, despite the fact 
that they lack the words trust and trustee, constructively imposed a 
fiduciary duty on the executive branch trustee, and defined the con-
tours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities.28o The Court also 
concluded that a fiduciary relationship necessarily arose because the 
government had assumed such elaborate control over forests and 
property belonging to the Indians.281 It noted that all of the necessary 
elements of a common law trust relationship were present: a trustee 
(the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust 
corpus (Indian timber, lands and funds).282 The Court went on to say, 
Because the statutes and regulations at issue clearly establish 
a fiduciary obligation of the government in the management 
and operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the govern-
ment for damages sustained. Given the existence of a trust 
relationship, it follows that the government should be liable 
in damages for a breach of its fiduciary duties. It is well es-
tablished that a trustee is accountable in damages for 
breaches of trust. This Court and several other federal courts 
have consistently recognized that the existence of a trust re-
lationship between the United States and an Indian or In-
dian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an 
injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting 
from a breach of trust. 283 
The Court disagreed with the government trustee's argument 
that violations of its statutory duties could be remedied by prospective 
relief such as declaratory, injunctive, or mandamus relief.284 It held 
proper system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper 
charges from allottees for maintenance of roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain 
funds from timber sales held by the funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative fees 
from allottees. Id. 
278 See id. at 226. 
279 Id. at 224. 
280 See id.; Wood, supra note 113, at 1518-19. 
281 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. 
282 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
283 Id. at 226. 
284 See id. at 227. 
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that such prospective remedies would be inadequate in this context 
for several reasons. 285 The Indian allottees were not in a position to 
monitor federal management of their lands because many were un-
educated, and most were absentee owners, with some not even know-
ing the exact location of their land.286 In addition, the Court factored 
in the reality that often, once the land has been mismanaged, the 
damage to the resources will have been so severe that prospective re-
lief would be worthless.287 
Much of the reasoning that led to the Court's conclusion in 
Mitchell II is directly applicable to cases litigated under the NRD trus-
tee provisions of CERCLA, CWA, and OPA.288 First, the idea that Con-
gress gave full control over the resources on Indian lands to the ex-
ecutive branch is directly analogous to the NRD provisions of 
CERCLA, CWA and OPA.289 Just as individual Indians or Indian tribes 
were not able to assert control over the resources on their allotted 
land, members of the public are not permitted to bring suit for dam-
ages to natural resources.290 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is the 
executive branch agency that exercises day-to-day supervision over 
land and resource development on tribal and allotted Indian lands.291 
Federal statutes allow BIA involvement in nearly all phases of timber, 
mineral, agricultural, and range resource development.292 Sometimes, 
the BIA fails to perform its duties adequately, and the tribes have used 
the trust doctrine to hold the government to strict fiduciary responsi-
bilities.293 By analogy, members of the public ought to be able to use 
the public trust doctrine or theories of common law trust to hold In-
terior and other executive branch NRD trustees to strict fiduciary re-
sponsibilities, and to collect damages when those duties go un-
fulfilled. 
A second similarity between the timber statutes at issue in Mitchell 
II and the CERLA, CWA and OPA NRD provisions is the elaborate 
control over natural resources that all the statutes give the govern-
285 See id. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. at 227-28. The Court recognized that once the natural resources such as 
timber on an allotment have been destroyed, it could take years for nature to restore them. 
See id. 
288 See gtmerally Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
289 See id. at 224-25. 
290 See O'Connor, supra note 38, at 149-50. 
291 See Wood, supra note 113, at 1478. 
292 See id. at 1478-79. 
293 See id. 
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ment.294 The Court in Mitchell II found that the elaborate control over 
forests and property belonging to the Indians necessitated finding a 
fiduciary relationship.295 The same could be said of the government's 
role in restoring natural resources-the decisions of how to restore 
and replace damaged resources, particularly in the wake of damage as 
devastating as that caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, are certainly 
exercises of elaborate contro1.296 
Third, the Court's explanation of the government's control of 
Indian resources is something to consider in the realm of NRD trus-
tees as well. 297 Just as many Indians are absentee owners of their allot-
ted land, many members of the public are not able to keep close tabs 
on damaged natural resources.298 The Mitchell II Court reasoned that 
a trusteeship would mean little if the Indian beneficiaries were re-
quired to supervise the day-to-day management of their estate by their 
trustee or else be precluded from recovery for mismanagement.299 
Like absentee owners of Indian land allottees, members of the public 
rely on government trustees to oversee restoration and rehabilitation 
of resources that they value, but can not fix themselves.30o It is this 
vulnerability and reliance that should give rise to an enforceable 
fiduciary duty. 
Of course, the reasoning that led to the conclusion in Mitchell II 
does not apply perfectly to the context of NRD trustees. For example, 
the Court also found an enforceable trust duty because many allottee 
land owners were uneducated.301 This argument does not apply to the 
case ofNRD trustees because the class of beneficiaries (the public as a 
whole) could not be characterized as vulnerable in the sense that be-
ing "uneducated" implies.302 It is difficult to know how much empha-
sis the Court placed on this factor as opposed to others, and whether 
the Court would have reached the same conclusion if the government 
294 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. 
295 See id. 
296 See id. 
297 See id. at 227. 
296 See id. For example, many Americans feel that they have a stake in the wilderness 
and natural resources of Alaska. There is a general feeling that the treasures of Alaska 
belong to ~s collectively. Yet, many citizens simply cannot monitor the progress of the Spill 
Trustee Council in restoring the damaged natural resources after the Exxon Valdez spill. 
We must rely therefore on the Spill Trustee Council to fulfill its fiduciary duties. 
299 See id. 
300 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 227 (1983). 
WI Seeid. 
302 See id. 
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had mismanaged the resources of a tribe whose members could have 
been characterized as highly educated.303 
Another problem is that the scope of the Court's holding is un-
clear because the Court failed to state how extensive a statute must be 
in delineating governmental duties before it will state an enforceable 
claim for monetary damages.304 This makes it difficult to apply the 
reasoning of Mitchell II to other statutes. In addition, the Court's inte-
gration of common law trust with Indian trust seems to conflict with 
its previously consistent position that the federal-tribal trust relation-
ship is unique.305 Explicit statements concerning the one-of-a-kind 
trust relationship between the government and Indian tribes would 
discourage an attempt to draw an analogy between it and another 
area of government trust. 
Finally, the Mitchell II Court's finding of an implied right of ac-
tion for damages under a federal statute is an inexplicable break from 
its previous jurisprudence on this topic, namely the Cort v. Ash306 test. 
The Court's failure to distinguish Cort v. Ash in Mitchell II makes it im-
possible to predict which standard the Court would use to determine 
whether an implied right of action for damages exists in the NRD 
trustee provisions ofCERCIA, CWA, and OPA.307 
CONCLUSION 
This Note does not conclude that Congress intended the princi-
ples of common law trust to apply to the NRD trustee provisions of 
CERCIA, CWA, and OPA. The Mitchell II Court correctly identified 
the presence of many elements of a common law trust in the relation-
ship between the BIA and Indian tribes and individuals, including a 
trustee, a beneficiary, and trust corpus.30B However, another necessary 
element of a common law trust, overlooked by the Mitchell II majority 
but identified by the dissenters, is the manifestation of intent to create 
a trust. 309 The question of whether Congress intended to create an 
enforceable trust is the key to understanding the proper approach to 
NRD litigation, but thus far remains unanswered. The statutes are si-
lent with regard to any definition of the trustee's fiduciary duties, and 
303 See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137. 
304 See id. 
305 See id. 
306 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For factors of the Curt v. Ash test, see supra note 140. 
307 See O'Sullivan, supra note 120, at 137-38. 
308 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 234 n.8 (1983). 
309 See id. 
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a court has yet to discuss the issue.lIIO The scant legislative history is 
not enough to infer the requisite intent on the part of Congress. 
However, this Note does recognize that it would be beneficial for 
courts to find that federal executive branch NRD trustees operate 
within the confines of a legally enforceable trust duty. This fiduciary 
duty would force trustees, such as Interior, to perform their job better 
and more efficiently by allowing members of the public to bring suit 
to enforce that duty. 
~10 See Murray et al., supra note 14, at 422. The authors state that Congress's use of the 
common law terms "trust" and "trustee" appears to imply its intention to impose on NRD 
trustees the responsibilities of a trustee as established by common law. This idea is further 
emphasized by the legislative history in which a committee noted that the legislation's 
purpose was to "preserve the public trust in the Nation's natural resources." [d. 

